China may well be victim of N. Korean nukes

China may well be victim of N. Korean nukes (Korea Herald Aug.5, 2009)

Few issues may have such a huge gulf between common sense and strategic judgment as the North Korean nuclear conundrum does. Given the geopolitical position of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile developments pose security threats that the major neighboring powers cannot overlook. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is possible that China may fall victim to the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. It appears that the United States regards North Korea's nuclear arsenal as a serious security threat and makes haste to dismantle, whereas China gives more weight to exercising a coordinating role in the nuclear issue between the United States and North Korea rather than to the damage it may face. In this respect there is a conflict between good sense and strategy. China shares a border with North Korea for five hundred miles. From a military point of view, therefore, North Korea's nuclear armament or deployment of long‐range missiles constitutes a practical threat to the security of China. Such a view may appear to be just a bugbear if we look only at the present relationship between North Korea and China, but from the perspective of a long history replete with conflicts among neighboring countries it cannot be considered a groundless fear. Such an apprehension may not be unfounded when we scrutinize the relapse of old diseases emphasizing "juche (self‐reliance)," "in our own way" or "Korean people first" ‐ lines that North Korea has often cried out in the past while denouncing China as revisionist ‐ or anti‐Chinese sentiment historically latent within North Korea that defector Hwang Jang‐yop refers to in his memoir. Secondly, it is widely known that China currently is an officially recognized nuclear weapons state and is the sole permanent member in Asia of the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, such a status is now challenged by North Korea's nuclear tests and ballistic missile development. North Korea carried out two nuclear tests after the withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and test fired ballistic missiles including Taepodong‐2. North Korea's attempts to justify such tests notwithstanding, the nature of the nuclear arms and missiles signal an intention to share the strategic position that China enjoys. While understanding the aforementioned circumstances, China has apparently defined the issue as a bilateral one between the United States and North Korea ‐ one which should be resolved between them. China has decided that the issue is a problem that may be solved easily if the United States accepts more demands or concedes to North Korea. Even after China made the North Korean nuclear issue an agenda for negotiation and hosted the six‐party talks, it concentrated its efforts on arranging opportunities for bilateral dialogue between the United States and North Korea using the framework of the talks. Nonetheless, the second nuclear test by North Korea proved that the North Korean nuclear program would never be abandoned by negotiation. The test also invalidated all the agreements already reached in the six‐party talks. After all, North Korea unremittingly pushed forward the development of nuclear and missile programs while conducting negotiations over dismantling them. Even under these circumstances, China's attitude vis‐a‐vis the North Korean nuclear issue is ambivalent. While consenting to the resolution of the United Nations Security Council for sanctions, China steps back from active implementation of the sanctions. China is not rushing to take the initiative in dismantling the North Korean nuclear program even though condoning the program could lead to a very dangerous situation as far as its security is concerned. This seems to be a strategic decision more than a practical one. North Korea's argument that nuclear development is justified in light of the United States' hostile policy is not consistent with the actual situation. The United States provided North Korea with hundreds of thousands of tons of food and heavy fuel oil during the Clinton to Bush administrations in an effort to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The States released the funds frozen in Banco Delta Asia and deleted it from the list of states sponsoring terrorism even though North Korea was known to be involved in various illegal activities, including counterfeiting money and cigarettes, and trafficking drugs. With these acts in mind, is the North justified in its condemnation of the United States as a power threatening North Korea? From a practical point of view, North Korean long‐range missiles and nuclear weapons could pose a greater menace to China or Japan than the continental United States. Although the United States, which suffered the tragedy of 9/11, has to prevent nuclear materials from being transferred from North Korea to the hands of terrorists, the threats posed by terrorists are not confined to the States but also existent in China or Russia. Should the North Korean regime shift its position, China could be exposed to far greater threats from North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles than the United States is. If North Korea obtains nuclear status, China's nuclear monopoly in East Asia will end and North Korea will become uncontrollable. Some strategists in China are concerned about the burden from refugees flooding into China in the event of a collapse of the North Korean regime caused by excessive sanctions. Other scholars argue that the "lips‐and‐teeth" theory is still valid that North Korea constitutes a defense screen for the security of Northeast China. These views, however, are tantamount to the argument that China should continue to support the Kim Jong‐il regime, which is preparing a second hereditary transfer of power while its economy is in a shambles from exorbitant military spending. On the contrary, a common‐sense policy for China is one that helps end North Korea's hereditary transfer of power, and helps create a regime that will invest in feeding its people instead of nuclear arms or missiles. It is because the right cause for human society is to follow a common wisdom when it clashes with strategies. By Lee Young‐il 2009.08.05